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Pay-as-You-Go Financing and Capital Outlay
Volatility: Evidence from the States over
Two Recent Economic Cycles
WEN WANG and YILIN HOU
Pay-as-you-go (pay-go or cash) and pay-as-you-use (pay-use or debt) are two
mechanisms to ﬁnance capital projects. While pay-go faces multiple constraints,
pay-use smoothes outlays, stabilizes tax rates, and improves inter-generational
equity. Thus, pay-use has dominated infrastructure ﬁnancing for decades. In
recent years, there has been revived academic interest in pay-go as an alternate
ﬁnancing mechanism; however, there is a large gap in the literature and
inadequate evidence on the effects of pay-go, especially its effects on capital
outlay volatility. This paper ﬁlls in the niche. Examining state experience over
the two recent economic cycles, this paper ﬁnds evidence that suggests that pay-
go is associated with lower volatility in capital spending in the long run, but may
increase short-run variability. We recommend that states couple pay-go in boom
years with pay-use in lean years. In unison, the two mechanisms can reduce
aggregate volatility and increase long-run stability of capital expenditures.
INTRODUCTION
The standard theory of public ﬁnance suggests that capital projects are best ﬁnanced
through pay-(as-you-) use means, i.e., debt, so as to spread out the payments of large
amounts of one-time spendingFthe sheer sums of capital projects are so large that it is
impossible to ﬁnance them with current revenue; thus, pay-use became necessary. As
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theoretical support for long-term debt, it was legitimately proposed and later became
accepted that pay-use also improves intergenerational equity.1 As pay-use became the
standard means of capital ﬁnancing, pay-(as-you-) go ﬁnancing, deﬁned in this paper as
‘‘general fund revenues allocated for the purpose of ﬁnancing capital projects,’’2 fell to a
secondary standing and has been even ignored in some cases. As a matter of fact, pay-go
remains a necessary supplement to pay-use and has even been recommended by pro-
fessional organizations3 and scholars as a best practice, especially when the economy is
strong and/or the entity has extra resources available.
However, there has been a big gap in the public ﬁnance and budgeting literature on
the working mechanisms and use of pay-go, and even less empirical research on the
effects of pay-go ﬁnancing on the cyclical patterns of state budgets. This study is an
attempt to ﬁll in the niche. We will ﬁrst propose hypotheses regarding the impact of pay-
go on the stability of total capital spending; then we will empirically test the validity of
our hypotheses to provide evidence on whether the use of pay-go increases or reduces the
long-run volatility and short-run variability of total capital spending over the business
cycle.
Capital outlays are large sums of expenditure on one-time projects; as such their
adoption and approval are much more sensitive to the impact that business cycles exert
on ﬁnancial administration and public attitude than the recurring, current expenditure
on daily operations of government ﬁnance. Capital expenditures may be drastically
reduced during times of budget shortfalls4 because state governments often cut capital
spending during downturns. The cut is politically easier and popular and technically
realistic since the beneﬁts of capital projects are less immediately apparent than those of
maintaining current programs. Therefore, states may delay their capital spending so as to
alleviate pressure on the operating budget.
On the other hand, with a developed capital/debt market and the theoretical support
of compensatory ﬁscal policy, states may, as long as they have enough debt capacity
remaining, make full use of long-term debt in a recession to maintain or even increase
capital spending as a means to boost the economy. In this scenario, we can see a real
complement between the two ﬁnancing mechanisms: more pay-go during boom years
1. Ronald C. Fisher, ‘‘Statement before the Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources Sub-
committee of the Committee on Government Operations,’’ in U.S. Congress, Federal and State Roles in
Economic Stabilization (Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1984), 101–107; Richard A. Mus-
grave and Peggy Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 5th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1989); and John Mikesell, Fiscal Administration-Analysis and Application for the Public Sector, 7th ed.
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishers, 2007).
2. Wen Wang, Yilin Hou, and William Duncombe, ‘‘Determinants of Pay-as-You-Go Financing of
Capital Projects-Evidence from the States,’’ Public Budgeting and Finance 27, no. 4 (2007): 18–42.
3. Government Finance Ofﬁcers Association (GFOA), Recommended Budget Practices (Chicago, IL:
GFOA, 1998); and National Association of State Budget Ofﬁcers (NASBO), State Expenditure Report
(1990–2004).
4. Leslie McGranahan, ‘‘State Budgets and the Business Cycle: Implications for the Federal Balanced
Budget Amendment Debate,’’ Economic Perspectives, 23, no. 3 (1999): 3–17.
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and more pay-use in lean years. More pay-use during recessions entails less use, and
more retirement, of debt in boom years so as to reserve debt capacity. This argument for
the complementary use of pay-go and pay-use was ﬁrst proposed in the 1940s as a
counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy by Alvin Hansen.5 This practice, if adopted by states, may
help mitigate the impact of business cycles on capital expenditures. This is especially
important during an economic recession because relatively stable capital spending can
help the state economy.6
This study attempts to empirically test the effects of pay-go ﬁnancing on the cyclical
stability of state capital expenditures. The complementary use of pay-go and pay-use
may beneﬁt the smooth operation of state ﬁnancial administration and avoid drastic
ﬂuctuations in state capital expenditures over the business cycle. While there have been
some studies on the stabilization of state operating budget,7 little is known about the
effect of pay-go on the stability of state capital spending. Therefore, this paper ﬁlls in the
gap in the current literature. This paper is organized as follows. The next section is a brief
survey of literature on pay-use and pay-go. In the third section, we offer models of
capital expenditure stability over the business cycle. The fourth section describes data
and methodology, with results and discussion offered in the ﬁfth section. The last section
concludes with directions for further exploration.
PAY-GO VERSUS PAY-USE: A BRIEF SURVEY
A cursory look through the ﬁnancial history tells us that cash payment for all trans-
actions was the norm for individuals, businesses (all very small in the early centuries),
and government (also very small) at the onset of the commercial and market system.
Later it was keenly realized by businesses (and government) that cash transaction was far
5. Yilin Hou, ‘‘Budget Stabilization Fund: Structural Features of the Enabling Legislation and Balance
Levels,’’ Public Budgeting and Finance 24, no. 3 (2004): 38–64.
6. Jun Peng, ‘‘The State Capital Funding Structure: Its Effect on the Operating Budget and Capital
Spending Growth,’’ Municipal Finance Journal 26, no. 2 (2005): 1–18.
7. See Russell Sobel and R. G. Holcombe, ‘‘The Impact of State Rainy Day Funds in Easing State
Fiscal Crises during the 1990–1991 Recession,’’ Public Budgeting and Finance 16, no. 3 (1996): 28–48; Brian
Knight and Arik Levinson, ‘‘Rainy Day Funds and State Government Savings,’’ National Tax Journal 52,
no. 3 (1999): 459–472; Gary A. Wagner, ‘‘Are State Budget Stabilization Funds Only the Illusion of
Savings? Evidence from Stationary Public Data,’’ Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 43, no. 2
(2003): 213–238; Yilin Hou, ‘‘What Stabilizes State General Fund Expenditures in Downturn Years-Budget
Stabilization Fund or General Fund Unreserved Undesignated Balance?’’Public Budgeting and Finance 23,
no. 3 (2003): 64–91; Yilin Hou, ‘‘Fiscal Reserves and State Own-Source Expenditure in Downturns,’’Public
Finance Review 33, no. 1 (2005): 117–144; Gary A. Wagner and Erick M. Elder, ‘‘The Role of Budget
Stabilization Funds in Smoothing Government Expenditures over the Business Cycle,’’ Public Finance
Review 33, no. 4 (2005): 439–465; and Gary A. Wagner and Russell Sobel, ‘‘State Budget Stabilization
Fund Adoption: Preparing for the Next Recession or Circumventing Fiscal Constraints?’’ Public Choice
126, no. 1 (2006): 177–199.
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too restrictive and inadequate for (working) capital needs and investment for production
expansion; the idea of ‘‘credit and debt/borrowing’’ was invented and put into practice.
Credit and debt greatly boosted productivity, economic growth, and the market system
in human history.
Founding of the American Republic saw an open debate, between Alexander Ham-
ilton and Thomas Jefferson, concerning the consolidation of federal and state debts
incurred during the Revolutionary War. Hamilton proposed consolidation to establish
the credit of the United States on the ﬁnancial market. Jefferson opposed Hamilton’s
idea, based on the belief that debt would weaken the constitutional foundation of gov-
ernment, in particular state autonomy, because of the resulting social and economic
inequalityFthe wealthy bankers and speculators who bought the debt would have
ﬁnancial leverage on the government. In 1798, Jefferson placed a balanced budget
amendment into the Constitution to eliminate the federal government’s ability to bor-
row, which is echoed by Andrew Jackson’s urge to reduce federal debt a few decades
later.8
In the early 19th century, however, state and local governments borrowed heavily in
the absence of regulation; defaults occurred in several states and cities.9 As part of the
correction efforts, the practice of, and requirement for, ‘‘cash payment’’ for large items
returned, under the new name of ‘‘pay-as-you-go’’ in the mid-19th century.10 The term
crept into the ﬁnance terminology unnoticed by public ﬁnance scholars,11 yet has since
occupied a permanent place in the public ﬁnance literature.12 Worth our attention is the
purpose of pay-as-you-go, as stated explicitly by the New York Comptroller in 1843:
The State of New York should not be in debt. In all future operations, its agents should be
required to pay as they go, and not spend the people’s money until they have it in hand.13
8. Carolyn Webber & Aaron Wildavsky, A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986); James D. Savage, Balanced Budgets and American Politics (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); and Linda K. Kowalcky and Lance T. LeLoup, ‘‘Congress and the
Politics of Statutory Debt Limitation,’’ Public Administration Review 53, no. 1 (1993): 14–27.
9 Ronald C. Fisher, State and Local Public Finance, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Irwin, 1996); and D. Roderick
Kiewiet and Kristin Szakaly, ‘‘Constitutional Restrictions on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded
Indebtedness,’’ Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12, no. 1 (1996): 62–97.
10. New York State Comptroller used it in his 1843 annual report.
11. It cannot be ascertained ‘‘by whom this term was invented [or] when it was ﬁrst advanced
in application to the policy of ﬁnancing permanent improvements from current revenues . . . .’’ See Paul
Studensky, Public Borrowing (New York City: The Ford Baltimore Press, 1930), 19.
12. John Bogarde Bazuin, ‘‘A Study of the Financing of the Construction of Municipal Permanent
Improvements out of Current Revenues Contrasted with the Traditional Method of Borrowed Funds and a
Practical Evaluation of the Principles Evolved through an Analysis of the Pay-as-You-Go Plans of Three
American Municipalities,’’ unpublished doctoral dissertation, Michigan State College, 1941.
13. Annual Report of New York State Comptroller for 1843, p. 27 (quoted in Studensky, p. 19),
emphasis added.
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As another correction effort in reaction to these defaults, balanced budget require-
ments (BBRs) and debt limitations were subsequently added into state constitutions and
laws.14
After the Civil War, ‘‘reconstruction’’ and large-scale ‘‘internal improvements’’
started a new round of borrowing in the states, until the Progressive Movement rein-
stalled the balanced budget norm as a symbol of efﬁciency and integrity in government.
Alongside the turn toward liberal ﬁscal policy in the 1930s,15 the Keynesian theory
legitimized deficit spending; heavy borrowing was reignited. Even then, opponents at-
tacked the New Deal and the deficits associated with it, establishing the foundations of
debate over federal borrowing. The debate has continued till the present day.16 Occa-
sional defaults by state and local governments also prompted the passage of state con-
stitutional restrictions upon debt ﬁnancing during the 20th century.17 Thus, it can be
concluded that during much of the U.S. history, public debt has been considered as a
threat to the solvency of governments and should therefore be avoided as much as
possible. Although the balanced budget norm was often violated when governments had
no choice but to borrow in order to ﬁnance large capital projects and wars, it has been
widely held by the general citizenry and elected ofﬁcials that state and local governments
should in principle balance their budgets annually.
The debate about, and the shift of practice between, the two ﬁnancing mechanisms did
not stop; in fact academic research went deeper, exploring the constitutional, political,
economic as well as social aspects of pay-go versus pay-use. There are several advantages
in using pay-go to ﬁnance capital improvement. It saves interest expenditures that can be
used to expand future services or to reduce the tax rate. It also permits greater ﬂexibility
for future operations because less of the budget is committed to annual debt service
payments. Pay-go ﬁnancing preserves debt capacity and helps governments to achieve a
more favorable credit rating that can reduce interest costs when borrowing is necessary.
An argument for using pay-go to ﬁnance at least a share of capital projects is the desire
to leave a legacy of capital structure to the next generation of users. The concept of
patrimony coincides with the notion of pay-go and seems to make the most sense in
established and stable communities.18
14. Kiewiet and Szakaly; Yilin Hou and Daniel Smith, ‘‘A Framework for Understanding State Bal-
anced Budget Requirement Systems: Re-Examining Distinctive Features and an Operational Definition,’’
Public Budgeting and Finance 26, no. 3 (2006): 22–45.
15. Herbert Stein, The Fiscal Revolution: Policy in Pursuit of Reality, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: The
AEI Press, 1996).
16. Kowalcky and LeLoup (1993).
17. James C. Clingermayer and B. Dan Wood, ‘‘Disentangling Patterns of State Debt Financing,’’ The
American Political Science Review 89, no. 1 (1995): 108–120.
18. George Petersen and Thomas McLoughlin, ‘‘Chapter 14: Debt Policies and Procedures,’’ in Local
Government Finance: Concepts and Practices, eds. John E. Peterson and Dennis R. Strachota (Chicago:
Government Finance Ofﬁcers Association, 1991), 263–273.
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Amidst the return to conservative ﬁscal policy in the 1970s and 1980s19 for smaller
government and lower spending, another theory of pay-use was formulated to provide a
rationale for using long-term debt to ﬁnance capital projects.20 One argument goes that if
debt proceeds are invested in human infrastructure through funding education, job re-
training, and health programs, then the borrowed money will beneﬁt future taxpayers
with higher incomes than they would otherwise have (if the governmental programs had
not been provided). Thus, government borrowing can be easily repaid not only because
taxpayers will make more money but also because people with better education will
spend more purchasing goods and services from the private sector. Another positive view
of government borrowing holds that debt could ﬁnance programs beneﬁting people who
would never receive funding without government going into debt. A third positive view
of debt, based on the Keynesian theory, stresses that government spending funded by
debt helps stimulate the economy in a recession, which is ultimately beneﬁcial to every
individual as taxpayer and consumer. Finally, proponents of debt argue that long-term
borrowing helps improve intergenerational equity. Later generations who beneﬁt from
capital projects that have a long useable life, which they will inherit, should rightly
shoulder part of the accumulated debt.21
With the increasing need for debt and the convenience of obtaining it from the
growing ﬁnancial market, the amount of state debt increased in the 1950s to ﬁnance
higher education and the improvement and replacement of roads and bridges.22 The tax
revolts in the late 1970s and early 1980s restricted state/local access to guaranteed debt;
then nonguaranteed debt (revenue bonds) boomed. During economic downturns of the
1980s, many states resorted to issuing debt when they were faced with declining revenues
but increased program responsibilities. Therefore, states have become more reliant on
long-term debt, and also shifted from reliance on general-obligation debt to nonguar-
anteed debt as a means to circumvent the restrictive limits on general obligation debt.23
In more recent years, the indebtedness of states has nearly reached record levels.24 Ac-
cording to the U.S. Census Bureau’s Government Finance Statistics, state government
borrowing totaled over $483 billion and averaged $9.6 billion per state in 1998. The debt
burden, measured as a percentage of state personal income, averaged 8.15 percent.25 By
2006, total state debt had further increased to $871 billion.
19. Stein (1996).
20. James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner, Democracy in DeficitFThe Political Legacy of Lord
Keynes (New York: Academic Press, 1977).
21. Jack Rabin, ‘‘Public Debt: A Symposium,’’ Public Administration Review 53, no. 1 (1993): 31–49.
22. James L. Regens and Thomas P. Lauth, ‘‘Buy Now Pay Later: Trends in State Indebtedness 1950–
1989,’’ Public Administration Review 52, no. 2 (1992): 157–161.
23. Regens and Lauth; Roy Bahl and William Duncombe, ‘‘State and Local Debt Burdens in the 1980s:
A Study in Contrast,’’ Public Administration Review 53, no. 1 (1993): 31–49.
24. Mark D. Robbins and Casey Dungan, ‘‘Debt Diligence: How States Manage the Borrowing Func-
tion,’’ Public Budgeting and Finance 21, no. 2 (2001): 88–105.
25. Robbins and Dungan (2001).
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Business Cycles and the Volatility of State Capital Expenditures
So far there has been very little literature, let alone empirical evidence, on the volatility of
state government capital outlay over the business cycle; the effects of using pay-go versus
pay-use ﬁnancing are an area that has drawn almost no scholarly attention. A few studies
we have found barely related to our topic are reviewed as below.
States can decrease their general fund expenditures during economic downturns by,
among other measures, drastically reducing capital expenditure, which helps them to
achieve budget balance. Cuts in capital spending may be politically more acceptable than
cuts in other areas because capital spending presents immediate costs but only longer
term beneﬁts. However, ‘‘states’ ability to alleviate general budget pressures is limited by
the portion of capital spending that is being ﬁnanced by current revenues.’’ Further cuts
may not be necessary since debts can be used to ﬁnance capital projects.26
Own-source revenues of state government are expected to be positively correlated with
the business cycle since most of them rely on income elastic taxes such as personal and
corporate income taxes and sales taxes. Empirical evidence also indicates that state
revenues are procyclical.27 A previous study shows that federal grants appear to provide
some insurance against state-speciﬁc downturns, controlling for U.S.-wide effects with
the inclusion of time-ﬁxed effects.28 However, some scholars argue that counter-cyclical
ﬂows of federal grants to the states are not compatible with the central government’s
incentives. Because tax increases and expenditure cuts are costly in political terms, cen-
tral governments will face incentives to shift the costs of adjustment to subnational
ofﬁcials. The central government may borrow to smooth expenditures or even use ‘‘un-
funded mandates’’ to shift their responsibilities to the states. Therefore, federal grants to
the states are mostly expected to be procyclical.29
Given the procyclical properties of state own-source revenues and federal grants, the
option left for the states is to use borrowing to smooth expenditures in downturn years.
Empirical studies suggest that ﬁscal institutions such as BBRs and debt limitations may
have an impact on state ﬁscal decisions. If these ﬁscal rules are effective, they may
prevent state governments from using debt issuance to smooth expenditures.30
MODELING CYCLICAL STABILITY OF CAPITAL OUTLAY
Capital outlay as big items expenditure is more sensitive to the economic and revenue
boom–bust cycle than current expenditure, whereas one important function of govern-
26. See McGranahan (1999), 12.
27. Erik Wibbels and Jonathan Rodden, ‘‘Fiscal Decentralization and the Business Cycle: An Empirical
Study of Eight Federations,’’ Working Paper, 2005.
28. Bent E. Sorensen and Oved Yosha, ‘‘Is State Fiscal Policy Asymmetric over the Business Cycle?’’
Economic Review, Third Quarter, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2001.
29. Wibbels and Rodden (2005).
30. Ibid.
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ment is to maintain ﬁscal stability through policy design and implementation; thus, it is
important to investigate whether prevalent capital ﬁnancing mechanisms would promote,
and by how much, the stability of capital spending over the business cycle. The ideal
policy design would be such that the annual capital outlay is smooth with little ﬂuc-
tuation despite the ups and downs of the economy and the government revenue stream;
that is, the ﬂow of capital spending is ‘‘ideally’’ neutral to the business cycle. However,
this best, theoretical scenario is possible only on paper, with the purely counter-cyclical
ﬁscal policy as originally proposed by Hansen.31 In boom years, tax rates go high or
remain stable; surplus revenue ﬁnances capital outlay in the pay-go fashion, while debt is
retired or issued less, reserving the borrowing capacity for the downturn. In bust years,
tax rates will be reduced while borrowing increased to provide economic stimulus; capital
outlay will be ﬁnanced with the pay-use mechanism. By this design, the capital stream
would remain smooth, symmetrical over the expansion as well as contraction phases of
the cycle.
The real-world poses various restraints on the best policy design; two restrictions are
eminent. First, boom-year tax hikes are next to impossible with mounting electoral
pressure for tax reductions; thus, budget surpluses will be far from adequate to cover
capital outlay and debt will be necessary to maintain the capital stream required by
infrastructure needs. Second, the issuance of long-term debts, with a ﬂat debt service
structure, does not consider the business cycle effect on government revenue. Whether
the revenue stream is up or down, a prearranged equal amount has to be budgeted each
year as debt service. In this scenario, the boom-year capital outlay consists of partly pay-
go and partly debt; the bust-year capital spending carries more debt but little or no pay-
go. The policy thereby becomes asymmetrical over the business cycle.
Besides, the practice of capital ﬁnancing in the states also varies with their different
tradition. For example, a ﬁscally liberal state may opt to use only a little pay-go mingled
with debt in a boom and then issue more debt in lean years for infrastructure ﬁnancing.
In contrast, a ﬁscally conservative state may choose to go all out for pay-go in a boom,
and then uses little debt and forgoes pay-go in a lean year. A previous study ﬁnds a
strong correlation between a state’s propensity to borrow and its ideology, with the more
liberal states more likely to rely on debt to fund their capital projects and less likely to
use general fund and other state funds.32
The practice of capital ﬁnancing is further complicated with changing composition of
the major funding sources. State capital ﬁnancing mainly comes from four sources: (a)
long-term debt, or borrowing; (b) other state funds, or dedicated revenues; (c) federal
grants; and (d) the general fund.33 Long-term debt is either in the form of General
Obligations bonds or revenue bonds that usually come with an annually ﬂat debt service
schedule. Dedicated revenues include state gasoline taxes, tolls or fees from bridges, or
31. Alvin H. Hansen, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles (New York: Norton, 1941), 116, 261.
32. Jun Peng (2005).
33. See the State Expenditure Report series by the National Association of State Budget Ofﬁcers.
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other facilities. As dedicated funds, they are usually reserved or designated for capital use
only, with no regard to cyclical ﬂuctuations of state revenue. The largest federal grant is
for highway construction, and is ﬁnanced by the federal tax on gasoline. As discussed in
the literature review section, federal grants are usually procyclical, in a way similar to the
general fund, subject to the business cycle impact at the federal and state levels. In sum,
the asymmetry of capital ﬁnancing policy, different ﬁscal tradition of each state, and
varying composition of the funding sources are the three major factors that contribute to
the cyclicality of state capital outlay. Our modeling is to be based on this analysis.
We ﬁrst hypothesize, about an average state’s long-run volatility for capital outlay,
that the use of pay-go may help reduce the volatility or maintain the stability of capital
expenditures in the long run. More use of surpluses (pay-go) in boom years and less in
downturn years may contribute toward a smooth stream of capital investment. Debt
(pay-use), in contrast, may increase the long-run volatility because of the asymmetrical
distribution of its use over the cycle. Its impact on the stability of state capital outlays
depends on how effective ﬁscal rules are in restricting states’ debt issuance.
Long-run volatility and short-run cyclical variability are distinct concepts and capture
different attributes of capital spending over the business cycle. Our second hypothesis is
to test the effects of pay-go ﬁnancing on the short-run cyclical variability of capital
spending over the bust-boom of the economy and decline and rise of state revenue
collections. We hypothesize that the asymmetric distribution of pay-go and pay-use will
pose opposite signs from the long run: in the short run, pay-go ﬁnancing may increase
the cyclical variability of capital expenditures and pay-use may decrease it. Dedicated
state funds may increase volatility in both the long run and the short run because they
have been legally reserved or administratively designated for capital ﬁnancing regardless
of the economic cycle. Federal grants, being procyclical, will also be raising the volatility
of capital outlay for both the long and the short run.
A review of literature indicates that political factors and ﬁscal rules matter in states’
response to ﬁscal shocks and other ﬁscal outcomes.34 Besides examining the effects of the
major ﬁnancing mechanisms on the stability of state capital outlays, we also include
relevant variables of state politics and ﬁscal institutions so as to empirically test their
impact.
Based on the literature review and analysis above, we develop two empirical models of
long-run and short-run state capital outlay stability over the business cycle. The general
structure of the two models is shown below, with long-run capital outlay volatility
(LGap) or short-run variability (SGap) as the dependent variables, respectively:
LGap orSGap ¼ f ðpay-go; other state funds; federal funds; debt; socioeconomics;
demographics; politics; and fiscal institutionsÞ
34. James M. Poterba, ‘‘Do Budget Rules Work?’’ in Fiscal Policy: Lessons from Economic Research,
ed. Alan J. Auerbach (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 53–86.
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Dependent Variables
We construct two dependent variables to capture the long-run volatility and short-run
cyclical variability of state capital expenditures, respectively. The long-run dependent
variable is the absolute value of the deviation from the long-term trend of state capital
outlay.35 We ﬁrst use the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator to regress capital
spending against the time trend (year), assuming random distribution of expenditure
data around the trend line. The model used for this regression is represented as
Expit ¼ ai þ biTt
where Expit is the predicted value of capital expenditure for state i in year t; ai is the
constant for state i; bi is the linear trend parameter for state i; and Tt is the value of
the year in year t.
Deviations of actual capital expenditures from the trends are calculated by subtracting
the trends (Exp) from the actual expenditures (Exp). The deviations are expressed as a
percentage after being divided by the trends. Then the long-run dependent variable is
constructed as the absolute value of this percentage:
LGapit ¼ jðExpit  ExpitÞ=Expitj
We use the change in state capital expenditures from the immediate past year to
capture its short-run variability. Thus, the short-run dependent variable is constructed as
the absolute value of the ﬁrst difference of capital expenditures:
SGapi;t ¼ jExpi;t  Expi;t1j
Data of pay-go spending are from NASBO’s State Expenditure Report series, which is
the best available source for state capital spending over the 1989–2004 period. The data
are from actual ﬁgures of total state capital expenditures by source: the general fund,
federal fund, other state funds and bonds. When two consecutive reports present dif-
ferent actual spending ﬁgures, we take the ﬁgure from the following year’s report. For
example, if the 1999 and 2000 reports both have a ﬁgure for actual spending in 1999 and
the two are different, the ﬁgure from the 2000 report is used because the latter report has
had some revision and thereby corrected possible errors in the former report. Alaska is
an obvious outlier in capital spending with its mean level of pay-go spending way above
that of all other states; it is excluded from the analysis, as is true with most state studies.
Wisconsin is also excluded from the analysis: Although its exclusion is a bit out of the
convention of state studies, the fact that its capital expenditure data are not available in
this series warrants the exclusion.
35. The long-term trend of state capital expenditures is constructed based on data over the period of
1989–2004. Ideally we would like to use data from a much longer period of time to estimate the long-term
trend of state capital spending, but longer-span time-series data are not available for this analysis.
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Control Variables
Socioeconomic variables include per capita income, poverty and unemployment rates, and
state highway mileage per thousand population. Data for income are from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA); poverty and unemployment rates and state highway mileage
are from the Census Bureau. Demographic variables include population density, popu-
lation growth, percent of seniors in the population, and percent of out-migration, all from
the Census Bureau (the out-migration data are available only since 1989).36 Political
variables include gubernatorial election cycle, the majority of the Senate being Democrat,
the majority of the House being Democrat, and divided government,37 all from the Book
of the States series. All ﬁnancial ﬁgures are adjusted by the price index for state and local
government consumption expenditures provided by the U.S. BEA. Fiscal institutions in-
clude BBRs and tax and expenditure limitations (TELs).38 BBR is a matrix of four dum-
mies: (1) the governor must submit a balanced budget; (2) the legislature must pass a
balanced budget; (3) the governor must sign a balanced budget; and (4) the state may carry
deficits into the next budget cycle. The BBRs data are also from the Book of the States
series. TEL is a matrix of two indicator variables for revenue limitations and expenditure
limitations. The two variables are constructed based on Mullins and Wallin’s compre-
hensive study of this institution.39 Table 1 offers definitions and data sources of the
variables used; Table 2 provides summary statistics of the variables.
Estimation Methodology
In estimating panel models, we face two empirical challenges. First, the model may suffer
from autocorrelation of the error terms due to the time-series nature of the data. In the
presence of serial correlation, the OLS is no longer a best linear unbiased estimator
36. Those socioeconomic and demographic variables are expected to reveal voter preferences for capital
ﬁnancing mechanisms. For example, with a higher share of older residents or mobile population, voters
may be less likely to support pay-go ﬁnance of capital expenditures. Thus these variables could have a
significant impact on the stability of state capital expenditures. See Wang et al. (2007).
37. Nebraska is coded 0 for divided government, since it has a nonpartisan unicameral legislature. The
exclusion of Nebraska does not significantly affect the empirical results, and so it is included in the sample
for the analysis.
38. Budgetary institutions are potentially endogenous to past and current ﬁscal outcomes and to voter
tastes for ﬁscal restraints. However, there are at least two arguments in defense of the exogeneity of
budgetary institutions. First, when the institutions are relatively stable and costly to change, and then they
can be considered predetermined explanatory variables. Many of the constitutional limits on state deficits
were enacted in the 19th century. The more difﬁcult it is to change these limits, the more valuable the
variation across states is in reﬂecting the effects of these institutions on budgetary outcomes. Second, some
previous studies controlled for some measure of state voter preferences, and still found significant effects of
these institutions. See James M. Poterba, ‘‘State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary
Institutions and Politics,’’ Journal of Political Economy 102, no. 4 (1994): 799–821.
39. See Daniel R. Mullins and Bruce A. Wallin, ‘‘Tax and Expenditure Limitations: Introduction and
Overview,’’ Public Budgeting and Finance 24, no. 4 (2004): 2–15.
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(Blue), and the usual OLS standard errors and hypothesis test statistics are not valid.40
The results of a test for autocorrelation in panel data suggest that ﬁrst-order autocor-
TABLE1
Variable Speciﬁcations and Data Sources
Variable Speciﬁcation (data source)
Pay-go State per capita capital spending from General Fund (NASBO)
Other state funds State per capita capital spending from other state funds
(NASBO)
Bonds State per capita capital spending from bonds (NASBO)
Federal fund State per capita capital spending from federal fund (NASBO)
Per capita real income Per capita income, in thousands (BEA)
Poverty rate Percentage of population in poverty (Census)
Unemployment rate Percentage of population unemployed (Census)
Highway mileage State highway mileage per 1,000 population (Census)
Population growth Percentage of population growth (Census)
Population density Population per square mile (Census)
Percentage of
population over 65
Percentage of population aged 65 and above (Census)
Percentage of out-
migration
Percentage of out-migration in the population (Census)
Gubernatorial election
cycle
1 for governor’s election year, 0 otherwise (Book of the States)
Senate Democrat
majority
1 for Senate Democrat majority, 0 otherwise (Book of the States)
House Democrat
majority
1 for House Democrat majority, 0 otherwise (Book of the States)
Divided government 1 if governor and majority of both chambers of the legislature
being different parties, 0 otherwise (Book of the States)
Submit a balanced
budget
1 for submit a balanced budget, 0 otherwise (Book of the States)
Pass a balanced budget 1 for submit a pass a balanced budget, 0 otherwise (Book of the
States)
Sign a balanced budget 1 for submit a sign a balanced budget, 0 otherwise (Book of the
States)
No deficit carryover 1 for no deficit carry over, 0 otherwise (Book of the States)
Revenue limit 1 for revenue limit, 0 otherwise (Mullins and Wallin, 2004)
Expenditure limit 1 for expenditure limit, 0 otherwise (Mullins and Wallin, 2004)
Note: Financial variables (in per capita terms) are adjusted by the price index for state and local government
consumption expenditures provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
40. Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 2nd ed. (Cincinnati, OH:
South-Western College Publishing, 2003).
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relation (AR1) is present in the models.41 We use robust estimation; results show that
ﬁrst-order autocorrelation is corrected and the statistics are robust. The second chal-
lenge, despite our efforts to develop measures for the important variables in the capital
expenditures volatility model, is omitted variables bias. We add in the models state-ﬁxed
effects to control for time-invariant unobservable factors and year-ﬁxed effects to control
for nationwide unobservable changes. These may help reduce the bias to a certain extent.






Long-run volatility of capital outlay 24.00 42.51 0.00 808.38
Short-run variability of capital outlay (absolute
value of deviation from the trend in percentage)
51.63 137.22 0.13 3,193.08
Pay-go 20.64 75.83 0.00 1,348.87
Other state funds 100.72 120.07  28.07 1,624.11
Bonds 71.73 100.70 0.00 913.73
Federal fund 78.17 80.57 0.00 944.21
Per capita real income (,000) 26.15 4.23 16.90 41.72
Unemployment rate 5.22 1.41 2.20 11.40
Poverty rate 12.63 3.70 2.90 26.40
Highway mileage 25.66 26.60 3.42 137.09
Population growth 1.06 2.19  49.77 11.55
Population density 179.79 243.96 4.67 1,170.98
Percentage of population over 65 12.74 1.70 8.53 18.55
Percentage of out-migration 3.57 1.00 1.83 8.00
Gubernatorial election cycle 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
Senate Democrat majority 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
House Democrat majority 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
Divided government 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
Submit a balanced budget 0.87 0.33 0.00 1.00
Pass a balanced budget 0.76 0.42 0.00 1.00
Sign a balanced budget 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00
No deficit carryover 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Revenue limit 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Expenditure limit 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Note: Financial variables (in per capita terms) are adjusted by the price index for state and local government
consumption expenditures provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
41. The F statistics are 11.164 and 4.807 for the models with the two dependent variables, respectively;
the null of no ﬁrst-order autocorrelation is rejected by the test.
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expenditures can be represented as below:
LGapit ¼ ai þ gt þ b0xit þ eit
SGapit ¼ ai þ gt þ b0xit þ eit
where ai represents the state-ﬁxed effects, and gt the year-ﬁxed effects.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 3 reports the regression results of the effect of pay-go spending on the long-run
volatility of capital expenditures. Model 1 includes the four sources of capital outlay and
controls for socioeconomic variables; model 2 adds in state politics and ﬁscal institu-
tions. Results from the two model speciﬁcations are consistent; the signs and magnitudes
of the coefﬁcients are not sensitive to changes in the speciﬁcation, indicating that the
empirical results are in general reliable. The coefﬁcient on the pay-go variable is sta-
tistically significant at the 10 percent level. Its negative sign conﬁrms our hypothesis that
the use of pay-go ﬁnancing may help reduce the long-run volatility of capital spending.
Each dollar of pay-go can reduce the long-run volatility by 4.4 percent. Given that the
mean value of the long-run volatility is 24 percent and the 48-state average per capita
pay-go is about $20, this magnitude of the pay-go effect is remarkable. The coefﬁcients
on ‘‘other state funds,’’ ‘‘bonds,’’ and ‘‘federal fund’’ are all positive and statistically
significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that the use of these capital ﬁnancing sources
are associated with higher volatility of capital outlays in the long run. Further, these
three coefﬁcients are all larger than that of pay-go, by a margin from 14 percent (other
state funds) to 77 percent (federal fund) to 107 percent (debt). Considering that their
mean values are 2.5–5 times higher than that of pay-go, these funding sources push up
capital spending as a trend and their effects can overwhelm that of pay-go. Against this
possible scenario, the ‘‘cooling’’ effect of pay-go to ‘‘pull down’’ the up-rising trend may
become much more valuable. No doubt, the real world is much more complicated than
these few models can reveal, and further exploration are warranted.
The socioeconomic variables are not statistically significant except highway mileage.
The negative coefﬁcient of the variable indicates that states with higher highway mileage
are likely to experience less long-run volatility of capital expenditures. Model 2 is more
fully speciﬁed with the inclusion of state political and budgetary institutions to see whether
these variables affect the long-run volatility of capital expenditures. Although none of them
bears a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable, this full speciﬁcation as a
sensitivity test does not generate any ﬂip of signs or drastic ﬂuctuations in the magnitudes
of the coefﬁcients on the key variables of the four major capital ﬁnancing sources.
Table 4 reports estimation results of the impact of pay-go on the short-run cyclical vari-
ability of capital expenditures, our second hypothesis. Here we focus on the sign and mag-
nitude of the pay-go variable. The two models are speciﬁed in the same fashion as with the
two long-run volatility models in Table 3. The coefﬁcient on the pay-go variable is positive
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and significant at the 1 percent level in both models, consistent and robust, not sensitive to
changes in model speciﬁcation. The results indicate that the use of pay-go ﬁnancing tends to
increase the cyclical variability of capital expenditures in the short runFthis cyclical ﬂuc-
tuation comes with strong revenue streams in boom years and goes away with a sour econ-
omy. Each dollar of pay-go adds to the cyclical ﬂuctuation by $1.62, about 3 percentage
points (coefﬁcient 1.62 divided by 51.63, the mean of the dependent variable).
TABLE 3
Effects on Long-Run Capital Expenditure Volatility (48 States, 1989–2004)
(Dependent variable = absolute value of deviation from the trend in percentage)
Variable
Model 1 Model 2
Coefﬁcient t-statistics Coefﬁcient t-statistics
Pay-go  0.044 ( 1.67)*  0.043 ( 1.63)*
Other state funds 0.051 (2.42)** 0.053 (2.5)***
Bonds 0.091 (4.72)*** 0.090 (4.67)***
Federal fund 0.078 (2.75)*** 0.078 (2.71)***
Per capita real income (,000)  0.079  0.04  0.381 ( 0.21)
Unemployment rate 1.469 0.89 1.567 0.94
Poverty rate  0.108  0.18  0.083  0.14
Highway mileage  2.519 ( 3.5)***  2.359 ( 3.23)***
Population growth 0.094 0.24 0.091 0.23
Population density 0.103 0.7 0.128 0.87
Percentage of population over 65 1.349 0.31 1.859 0.43
Percentage of out-migration  0.782  0.12  0.442  0.07
Gubernatorial election cycle 1.984 0.96
Senate Democrat majority  5.922  1.22
House Democrat majority  0.496  0.12
Divided government  2.230  0.8
Submit a balanced budget  2.664  0.35
Pass a balanced budget  2.830  0.36
Sign a balanced budget 0.294 0.05
No deficit carryover  1.387  0.33
Revenue limit  4.421  0.44
Expenditure limit 10.969 1.09
Constant 26.818 1.65 22.603 1.38
R2 0.13 0.13
No. of observations 648 648
Notes: Statistical significance levels are as follows: *0.10, **0.05, and ***0.01.
Alaska is excluded as an extreme outlier and Wisconsin excluded due to missing observations.
Financial variables (in per capita terms) are adjusted using the BEA price index for state and local government
expenditures.
Coefﬁcients for state and year dummies are available on request from authors, but are not included in the table.
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The coefﬁcients of other state funds and federal funds also present a positive sign,
which suggests that these two capital ﬁnancing sources may also contribute to increasing
the short-run cyclical variability of capital expenditures. Their magnitudes, however, are
much smaller at only about 20 percent of the pay-go coefﬁcient. Debt (bonds) stands out
as the only ﬁnancing source that may help reduce the short-run variability (negative
TABLE4
Effects on Short-Run Capital Expenditure Variability (48 States, 1989–2004)
(Dependent variable = absolute value of ﬁrst difference in real per capita dollar values)
Variable
Model 3 Model 4
Coefﬁcient t-statistics Coefﬁcient t-statistics
Pay-go 1.616 (20.16)*** 1.620 (20.04)***
Other state funds 0.325 (4.83)*** 0.318 (4.68)***
Bonds  0.171 ( 3.19)***  0.177 ( 3.28)***
Federal fund 0.309 (3.73)*** 0.319 (3.79)***
Per capita real income (,000) 14.069 (1.73)* 12.920 1.58
Unemployment rate 10.757 (2.13)** 11.316 (2.21)**
Poverty rate 1.855 1.18 2.086 1.31
Highway mileage 3.300 1.01 3.032 0.92
Population growth  0.944  0.79  0.909  0.75
Population density 0.102 0.12 0.057 0.07
Percentage of population over 65 19.234 0.45 23.174 0.54
Percentage of out-migration 66.240 (3.05)** 64.025 (2.93)***
Gubernatorial election cycle 0.940 0.11
Senate Democrat majority 0.755 0.06
House Democrat majority  4.288  0.36
Divided government 0.529 0.07
Submit a balanced budget 21.404 1.09
Pass a balanced budget 6.185 0.27
Sign a balanced budget  7.738  0.52
No deficit carry over  32.182 ( 2.83)***
Revenue limit 1.844 0.07
Expenditure limit 28.600 0.80
Constant 67.04 6.12 37.53 1.34
R2 0.77 0.77
No. of observations 591 591
Notes: Statistical significance levels are as follows: *0.10, **0.05, and ***0.01.
Alaska is excluded as an extreme outlier and Wisconsin excluded due to missing observations.
Financial variables (in per capita terms) are adjusted using the BEA price index for state and local government
expenditures.
Coefﬁcients for state and year dummies are available on request from authors, but are not included in the table.
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sign), which is consistent to the ﬁndings of an earlier study.42 The size of it looks very
small: each dollar of bonds may reduce the variability by only 17 cents, or 3/10ths of a
percent; but since the state average of debt is about $72 per capita, the cumulative effect
can be as large as $23.6, near half of total short-run ﬂuctuations. Among the socio-
economic variables, unemployment rate and out-migration both pose positive results
significant at the 5 or 1 percent level, respectively, suggesting that states with higher
unemployment rates and out-migration ratios are more likely to experience higher cy-
clical variability in their capital outlays.
Similar to model 2, we test the effects of political and budgetary institutions on the
short-run variability in model 4. The estimated coefﬁcients of the variables for the four
capital ﬁnancing sources are similar to those in model 3. ‘‘No deficit carryover’’ has a
negative coefﬁcient and is highly significant, which indicates that this budgetary rule has
been effective in maintaining the short-run stability of state capital outlays. Other po-
litical and budgetary institutional variables do not seem to create a significant impact on
the stability of capital expenditures.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Pay-as-you-go (cash) ﬁnancing of infrastructure poses multiple constraints; in contrast,
pay-as-you-use (debt) presents many advantages by smoothing outlay over an extended
period of time, thereby stabilizing tax rates and by improving intergenerational equity.
For decades, debt has dominated the ﬁnancing of capital outlay. It greatly boosted
infrastructure construction; the use of municipal bonds has received significant academic
attention. In recent years, however, there has been revived interest of the research com-
munity on pay-go as an alternate ﬁnancing mechanism; but so far little is known about
the use of pay-go ﬁnancing. There has been inadequate study on the mechanisms and
beneﬁts of pay-go ﬁnancing of state capital expenditures in the literature, and even less
empirical research on the effects of pay-go ﬁnancing on the cyclical patterns of state
capital spending. This study is an attempt to ﬁll in the niche. This paper has contributed
to the literature by proposing a model that examines the effects of pay-go on the long-
run volatility as well as the short-run cyclical variability of state capital expenditures. It
has generated empirical evidence to suggest that the use of pay-go ﬁnancing is associated
with lower volatility in capital spending in the long run, but it contributes to increasing
the cyclical variability of capital expenditures in the short run.
Although the results of this study seem a little detached from practice in a debt-
dominated world, they still bear (at least some) indirect implications for policy makers.
Professional organizations such as GFOA and NASBO recommend pay-go as a best
practice in public ﬁnancial administration for more ‘‘rational’’ use of extra cash in boom
years; such use of cash as a supplement to already dedicated debt ﬁnancing of capital
42. McGranahan (1999).
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construction adds to the cyclical variability of capital outlay over the economic cycle.
However, pay-go helps to maintain the long-run stability of state capital expenditures by
reducing its volatility. The issuance of bonds could help reduce the short-run variability
of capital spending, but it appears to contribute to increasing the volatility of capital
spending in the long run. Therefore, we strongly recommend, based on the above results
and inference, that states should consider more use of pay-go with less pay-use in boom
years; the reserved debt capacity will then be released more intensively in lean years. In
this way, pay-go will serve as a real complement to pay-use; the two mechanisms for
ﬁnancing infrastructure may work in unison to reduce the aggregate volatility and
thereby improve the long-run stability of capital expenditures. That will be moving in the
direction of the tax-smoothing approach and a symmetric counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy.
Finally, there is a caveat about this study. The results of this study are still very
preliminary due to data limitations. More exhaustive research, with better, longer time-
series cross-sectional data, is necessary to improve our understanding of the mechanisms
of capital ﬁnancing in general and of the effects of pay-go on the stability of state capital
expenditures in particular.
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